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Boom to bust – Reconstructing the Spanish economy 
Part Two: Policy Responses to the Economic Crisis 
 
ABSTRACT 
Recession in Spain led to intervention by the government to stimulate the economy, a response that was 
replicated around the world. But as public finances deteriorated, financial markets and some policy makers 
demanded credible austerity measures (exit strategies) to reduce growing public sector debts. There was 
particular external pressure on Spain since any sovereign debt default would have serious repercussions at 
least throughout the European Union. Thus, from autumn 2009 stimulus measures began to be withdrawn and 
replaced by austerity ones. In addition, recession high- lighted fundamental weaknesses in the Spanish 
economic model. Part one of this article (Salmon 2010) charted the passage of the Spanish economy into 
recession through examining key three features that were specific to Spain, the financial system, conditions in 
the property market, and the exceptional level of unemployment. The second part examines the 
macroeconomic policy measures taken in Spain and the outlook for a new economic model. It concludes that 
Spain had little alternative but to severely tighten fiscal policy and that a new economic model will be 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. 
 




As the economic crisis gathered momentum in 2008 the response by governments in western 
industrialized countries was to introduce economic stimulus measures through fiscal and monetary 
loosening. The Group of 20 summit meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2009 declared that member 
countries would ‘sustain our strong policy response until a durable recovery is secured’ (G20 2009). 
But as global growth prospects improved and debt problems in Europe threatened not only to 
destabilise Europe but the global economy, the emphasis shifted to tightening fiscal policy and 
implementing debt reduction strategies. Thus the Group of 20 summit in Toronto in June 2010 
ended with an ambiguous declaration that supported a variable response, allowing for both 
immediate policy tightening (as was being adopted in Europe) and postponement of tightening (as 
was being adopted in the United States). Beyond this debate over macroeconomic policy (see 
Financial Times 2010) lay a much more profound one over the future of capitalism (see, e.g., 
Kaletsky 2010) and the economic model for the twenty-first century. The following discussion looks 
at how these debates were played out in Spain. 
 
 
THE POLICY RESPONSE 
Successive Socialist (PSOE) governments attempted to embrace economic and fiscal conservatism 
(as implemented by Pedro Solbes until he left the government in April 2009) with social liberalism, in 
which a process of social dialogue was adopted to try to achieve key changes. From the onset of the 
economic slowdown this political perspective was translated into policy responses through a series 
of stimulus packages and ad hoc measures amounting to one of the largest fiscal stimuluses in the 
EU and above the average in the OECD, implemented from April 2009 by a new minister of finance, 
Elena Salgado. BBVA (2009) estimated that the discretionary fiscal measures introduced between 
2008 and 2009 were worth €50 billion; adding the impact of ‘automatic stabilisers’ such as increased 
welfare payments (for example unemployment benefits doubled between 2007 and 2009 to some 
€32 billion) then BBVA estimated the total stimulus to be worth 11.8% of GDP, over twice the EU 
average. In addition, monetary policy as set by the European Central Bank (ECB) provided a low-cost 
lending window for banks and took interest rates down to record low levels in late 2008 and 2009 
(the twelve month euribor rate falling from a peak average of 5.38% in September 2008 to 1.33% in 
August 2009), providing additional disposable income for those with debts (especially those with 
outstanding mortgages). In spring 2010, as fears grew over sovereign debt and the stability of the 
Spanish financial system, wholesale money markets stopped lending to Spanish banks, the ECB was 
increasingly not just the ‘lender of last resort’ but the lender of only resort’. Measures to ensure the 
stability of the financial system (notably the FROB) were the most important and potentially the 
most costly for the public purse (these measures were also supported by actions taken by the ECB). 
Among the other measures the most important by value were a tax refund to all income taxpayers in 
2008 and 2009 and funding in 2009 and 2010 to boost local authority infrastructure spending (the 
FEIL). The tax refund of €400 per income tax payer was estimated to cost some €12 billion over 2 
years, but this may have been used more to reduce debt and rebuild savings than to stimulate 
spending. Probably the most effective short-term measures were the funds to boost local authority 
infrastructure projects in 2009 and 2010 (worth €8 billion and €5 billion, respectively). In 2009 alone, 
funding was projected by the government to create over 200,000 jobs and may in practice have 
created many more (although many of these jobs were of short duration). In addition to these 
measures introduced specifically to counter the crisis, tax reductions decided on before the crisis 
were feeding through into the economy during 2008 and 2009 (e.g., corporation tax and income tax 
reforms). 
 
Table 1: Economic stimulus measures introduced 2008 to spring 2010 
Sector  
Financial System Enhanced deposit and investment guarantee fund  
(Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos y del Fondo de Garantía de Inversiones, FGDGDI) 
Fund to buy financial assets should the need arise 
(Fondo para la Adquisición de Activos Financieros, FAAF) 
Fund to Support restructuring in the banking sector  
(Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria, FROB) 
Infrastructure Bringing forward infrastructure projects Fund for investment by local authorities 
(Fondo Estatal de Inversión Local, FEIL) 
Fiscal Measures Numerous measures introduced, the largest being an income tax rebate for all taxpayers in 
2008 and 2009 
Support for small businesses Numerous measures including government sponsored loans 
Support for the housing market Measures mainly to promote the rental sector 
Specific sector measures Notably aid to support the motor-vehicle industry (Plan 200E) 
Support for vulnerable social groups Measures for example to support the unemployed and those with mortgage repayment 
difficulties 
Support for labour mobility Increased investment in retraining and promotion of the rental housing sector 
Structural measures Transposition of the European Services Directive and proposals for a law promoting a 
sustainable economy (Ley de Economía Sostenible) 
Source: Author compilation 
 
From autumn 2009 the stimulus measures began to be withdrawn and austerity measures 
introduced, first in the Consolidated State Budgets for 2011, then in a number of austerity packages 
in early 2010 (including the Plan de Acción Inmediata 2010 and Plan de Austeridad 2011–2013) and 
finally in the ‘Plan de medidas extraordinarias para reducir el gasto público’ in May 2010. In total, tax 
increases and spending cuts added up to one of the most severe austerity packages in Europe, 
designed to cut the budget deficit from 11.2 per cent in 2009 to 3 per cent in 2013. Year-on-year 
increases in government revenue and public spending reductions were required to meet the target 
in a political economy where regional governments were now responsible for a large pro- portion of 
public spending, where unemployment was already at exceptionally high levels, where little growth 
was forecast in the near future and where the government relied on minority parties to pass 
legislation. 
 
Structural measures were initially more limited, confined mainly to transposing the European 
Services directive (Directive 2006/123/EC)  into law (marking another step in opening the service 
sector to a greater degree of com- petition) and proposals for a sustainable economy law (Ley de 
Economía Sostenible; MEH 2009). But as external economic and political pressures grew, progress 
was made with more fundamental structural reforms, notably reform of the regulations governing 
savings banks (Lorca 2010; BOE 2010a), reform of the labour market (Real Decreto-ley de medidas 
urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo; BOE 2010b), and proposals over reform of the 
pensions sys- tem. Such reforms, along with the stiff austerity measures, provoked increasing 
popular resistance (as expressed in strike action and anti-government demonstrations) and demands 
from the opposition during the State of the Nation debate in July 2010 for the resignation of the 
government. Implementing the austerity plans would clearly be difficult in the face of popular 
discontent, political opposition and the pattern of decentralised government. 
 
In sum, the forces at work to both stimulate and contract the economy in 2008/09 were enormous. 
Developed market economies faced a downward spiral of contraction. Against this were the 
powerful stimulus measures applied by many governments, especially in the US, the UK, in China 
and Spain. By the second quarter of 2009 stimulus measures appeared to be stabilising economies. 
But these measures were introduced at enormous public cost and were temporary. By mid-2009 all 
governments that had introduced stimulus measures were seeking exit strategies to rebuild their 
public finances and maintain a path to recovery. The debate was largely over timing, tighten 
immediately (as in Europe, see Trichet 2010) or postpone tightening until growth was more 
established (as in the United States, see Summers 2010). Given the market and political pressures 
facing Spain in early 2010 (including fear over a potential break-up of the eurozone), Spain had little 
option but to tighten early. This required immediate and on-going cuts in public spending and tax 
increases. There was a serious political risk that the government would lose support and be forced 
from office, and an economic risk that the measures would derail recovery. Recovery was fragile and 
the shape of any economic recovery difficult to predict. 
 
TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMIC MODEL 
The outline of a long-term response to the economic crisis was emerging by mid-2009 (for details of 
a comprehensive government view see, for example, the draft law on a sustainable economy; MEH 
2009). Firstly, the hegemonic philosophy of unfettered markets (market fundamentalism) was no 
longer accepted as the sole mechanism for creating long-term sustainable growth (see e.g. Kaletsky 
2010). Following the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy (2008) said: ‘laissez faire, c’est fini’. Similarly, the Spanish vice-president, Fernández de la 
Vega, was quoted in early September 2009 as saying that the blame for the crisis should be on those 
that: ‘creyeron que el Mercado lo solucionaba todo’ (Cinco Días 2009). The philosophy was never 
accepted in China and India and was viewed with scepticism in those emerging economies that had 
suffered their own serious financial crises. Careful regulation, especially in the financial sector, was 
essential as part of any liberalisation process. Secondly, although unconstrained liberalisation was 
potentially destabilising, further liberalisation of the economy (notably in the service sector and 
labour market) along with institutional reform was necessary to improve competitiveness and 
enable the economy to adjust more quickly to change. Thirdly, a model of growth based on high 
levels of consumer debt and property development was not a sound base for sustainable growth. 
Fourthly, continued low productivity and low levels of investment in research and development 
undermine competitiveness. Spain could only compete in the world economy through productivity 
improvements, improved quality, innovation and more technologically advanced products and 
services. This required more investment in research and development together with a more skilled 
labour force (in 2009 the OECD published figures showing that students in Spain completed an 
average of only 10.6 years of schooling compared with 13.4 years in Germany and 13.3 in the United 
States; OECD 2009a). Finally, a new model will reflect concerns over climate change (see Plan 
Nacional de Adaptación al Cam- bio Climático; Ministerio de Medio Ambiente 2008), water (for 
discussions on climate change and water in the economy, see Lopez-Gunn 2009) and energy 
security, it will thus be more energy efficient and rely more on renewable power (see OECD 2009b). 
These types of changes were implied in repeated calls for a new economic model. For example, in 
August 2009 the Secretary of State for the Economy, José Campa, said in an interview with Cadena 
SER (Cadena ser 2009) that: ‘lo más importante en estos momentos es crear un nuevo patrón de 
crecimiento para la economía española .. .’ Less clear was exactly how this model would be created: 
how structural change would be financed; where the boundary of the public sector would be drawn; 
what would be the nature of the welfare state in the new model; and what would be the 
constitutional form of the state. 
 
Any new economic model had to emerge from the existing cultural con- text, institutional and 
economic structures, and as such would be partly ‘path dependent’. In the first quarter of 2010 the 
employment structure (those in employment) comprised 4.5 per cent in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing; 14.1 per cent in industry (less than 13 per cent in manufacturing if energy and mining were 
excluded); 9 per cent in construction; and 72.3 per cent in services (INE 2010). Growth in the next 
decade was therefore likely to be driven essentially by services. 
 
Employment in the primary sectors of mineral extraction, fishing, forestry and agriculture continued 
to fall. Mineral extraction was restricted by the lack of economically recoverable deposits and 
planning restrictions, fishing by dwindling fish stocks (although fish farming may expand), forestry by 
planning and land ownership restrictions, and agriculture by water supply problems, rising costs of 
production and low-cost overseas competition. 
 
Similarly, employment in manufacturing remained on a path of employment contraction as cheaper 
production platforms outside Spain monopolised mass production that used established 
technologies to produce products for the global market and as these platforms developed the 
capabilities to produce more technologically advanced and higher quality products. According to the 
Labour Force Survey (INE 2010) from the first quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2010 industry 
lost 665,000 jobs, employment shrinking by over 20 per cent from 3.3 million to 2.6 million. It was 
particularly difficult to hang on to some manufacturing in basic metals, ‘textiles, clothing and shoes’ 
(which by 2010 had lost over half the jobs it provided in 2000), furniture, toys and even some 
businesses in the transport sector (e.g., shipbuilding). One hurdle to growing high-technology 
manufacturing was the small size of this segment. According to the Labour Force Survey (INE 2010), 
in the first quarter of 2010 the pharmaceutical, ‘informatics, electronics and optical equipment’ and 
electrical equipment industries employed only 190,000 (8% of those in manufacturing), the 
transport sector a further 279,700 (12% of those in manufacturing). Even in new technology areas 
manufacturing was difficult to retain in Spain. For example, alternative energy technologies (such as 
wind turbines and solar panels) were frequently cited as new shoots for manufacturing growth. But 
production capacity for these was expanding in emerging markets. Hence, businesses were being 
forced either into the upstream or the downstream segments of the manufacturing supply chain: 
research & development, design, marketing, distribution, retailing, after-sales and logistics. Even in 
these segments com- petition was growing as businesses in emerging markets attempted to capture 
more of the supply chain (Rosen and Heineman 2009). 
 
In construction, the domestic industry remained cyclical. It was unlikely that the domestic 
construction and property sector would ever regain the significance they developed in the first 
decade of the century, since at that time the sector was buoyed by the combination of factors 
mentioned above plus major public works associated with real public infrastructure weaknesses and 
financial transfers from the EU. 
 
Services continued to become an even larger part of the economy, many in the non-traded sector. In 
the traded sector, Spain had developed internationally competitive businesses in architecture, 
banking, construction, design, energy, infrastructure management, retailing, telecommunications, 
tourism, urban services and water. These had benefited from a degree of protection in the domestic 
market and a lack of effective competition in many emerging markets. Both of these advantages 
were being squeezed as liberalisation opened up the domestic market and businesses in emerging 
economies became more competitive. Nevertheless, these services were likely to form the structural 
basis of a rebuilt economy. 
 
Overseas, Spain had established a competitive advantage in Latin America derived from its cultural 
links with the region and the experience its businesses gained from the privatisation process at 
home that was applied to privatisation opportunities in the region (Chislett 2002, 2003; Guillén 
2005). Access to one of the world’s most widely spoken languages continued to provide a 
competitive edge in Latin America while increasing cross-border experience supported expansion 
elsewhere in the world. The new economic model appeared set to be more open, with increased 
foreign ownership of businesses in Spain and policy support for further internationalisation by 
Spanish companies (support for the latter also came from many economic commentators; see e.g. 
Chislett 2010). 
 
Finally, research and development, innovation and a more skilled and flexible labour force were 
generally cited as key elements in any new model. From a very low base of investment in research 
and development and from very low patent registrations on innovation some progress had been 
made. But public spending to support R&D was hampered by requirements to rebuild public 
finances. At the same time, private sector spending was restricted by the composition of businesses 
in Spain, their ownership and their own financial positions. Thus a dramatic turn-a-round in these 
areas could not be expected. Equally, the institutional reforms necessary to improve the efficiency of 




At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century Spain was a medium size open economy. 
Growth was inextricably bound-up with that of the European Union and the world, and the pattern 
of growth with existing economic and institutional structures in Spain. But domestic policy actions 
were also shaping recovery and the architecture of the evolving political economy. 
 
The development path was in large measure determined by the structure of the existing economy 
and by the investment decisions made by businesses, particularly transnationals in relation to how 
they structured their global supply chains. These decisions were influenced by the business 
environment in Spain and its relative attraction compared with that of other locations. Shaping this 
environment, however, was a crucial government responsibility. Beyond this, the government had to 
decide how far it would go in providing more active support for structural adjustment.  Thus, the 
new economic model embraced an important role for the government. 
 
The financial sector boasted two major transnational banks that looked set to become larger and 
more geographically diversified. In the savings bank sector market pressures and state 
encouragement were driving consolidation, although it remained to be seen how successful a 
process of rapid consolidation, shaped in part by local political interests, would be. The outcome was 
not only critical for the financial system, it would also contribute to the nature of the emerging 
constitutional form of the state. 
 
In the property market the overhang of unsold properties was likely to depress property prices and 
impede recovery at least through to 2011. Construction work was initially cushioned by public works, 
although this became more difficult to finance through public funding. New mechanisms would have 
to be sought to attract private funds. Beyond 2011 the property and construction sector would begin 
to recover, but it was unlikely to develop to the same scale that it enjoyed in the early years of the 
first decade. This would provide space for investment in more productive activities. 
 
Unemployment continued to rise into the first half of 2010. Absolute numbers unemployed were the 
highest ever recorded in Spain and the rate too approached the levels of the early 1990s. 
Exceptionally high unemployment would remain a problem for several years, posing serious 
challenges for individuals, society and the government. 
 
Finally, economic crises generally led to paradigm shifts in economic management: the late 1970s 
witnessing a shift from Keynesianism to monetarism and more reliance on markets; the early 1990s 
to a focus on the Maastricht criteria and inflation targeting (Kaletsky 2010). The short-term response 
to the credit crisis was towards a dramatic increase in state intervention, the ‘Washington 
consensus’ and ‘market fundamentalism’ appeared to be dead. But it was not clear what the new 
form of management would look like in the second decade of the twenty-first century. There were 
renewed arguments for greater government involvement in the economy, not least those derived 
from the experience of high growth in emerging economies in south-east Asia. Yet liberalisation 
continued to gain ground, tempered by more careful regulation and state self-interest. With regard 
to economic management, monetary policy was shifting away from simply targeting retail price 
inflation to embrace a broader range of metrics. On a wider canvas, measures to reduce global 
economic imbalance (big differences in national savings, consumption and investment rates 
reflected in large trade deficits and sur- pluses) required adjusting economic policy in states around 
the world. In Spain and elsewhere in Europe, what the economic crisis was triggering was a re- 
evaluation of the nature of the welfare state and how this could be sustained. A new economic 
model was emerging, but it was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. 
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